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David A. Wise 
This is the fifth in a series of  volumes dealing with the economics of  aging. 
The prior volumes, also published by the University of Chicago Press, are The 
Economics of  Aging (1989), Issues in the Economics of Aging (1990), Topics 
in  the Economics  of  Aging  (1992), and Studies  in the Economics  of  Aging 
(1994).  The papers in this volume deal with labor market behavior, health care, 
housing and living arrangements, and saving and wealth. 
Labor Market Behavior 
In “The Effect of Labor Market Rigidities on the Labor Force Behavior of 
Older Workers,” Michael Hurd explores compensation arrangements  and other 
employment practices that constrain workers to a particular number of hours 
per day, days per week, or weeks per year. Labor market rigidities include the 
inability to change hours, days, or weeks in an existing job; impediments to 
taking a different job with a more desirable combination of hours, days, and 
weeks; and situations that require a disproportionate  sacrifice in compensation, 
job satisfaction, mental or physical requirements, or location in order to obtain 
a more desirable work schedule. The paper surveys the evidence on labor mar- 
ket rigidities, particularly as they affect older workers. 
Hurd concludes that most workers of all ages face rigidities, and that these 
rigidities tend to arise from fixed employment costs and the requirements of 
team production. For example, part-time work will tend to have lower money 
wages than full-time work, because a greater fraction of the work time will be 
necessary to cover the fixed costs of  employment. Similarly, the efficiencies 
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associated with team production will tend to concentrate work hours and pe- 
nalize those who want to work irregular hours or work part-time. These rigidi- 
ties imply that an older worker cannot easily reduce hours (or phase into retire- 
ment) in a career job. 
However, there are additional impediments to older workers who want to 
change jobs. Because it takes time to acquire job-specific skills, and because 
older workers can be expected to stay in a new job for fewer years than a 
younger worker, employers are likely to be more reluctant to invest in new job 
training for older workers. In general, this means that older workers who move 
to jobs with fewer work hours must accept positions with fewer job-specific 
skills, high turnover rates, and lower compensation. 
Labor market rigidities for older workers also result from the structure of 
retirement policies. For example, the financial structure of Social Security and 
pension plans tends to inhibit retirement (or job mobility) at some ages, and 
induce retirement (or job mobility) at other ages. Pension plans may also dis- 
courage part-time work by  basing pension benefits on final salary rates. The 
Social Security earnings test may discourage work beyond the earnings limit. 
Employer-provided health  insurance  may  reduce job  mobility, particularly 
among workers with preexisting conditions. While the effects of these policy- 
related rigidities are difficult to quantify, Hurd suggests that they are probably 
less important than the labor market rigidities that result from fixed employ- 
ment costs and team production. 
Because the cost of  changing jobs late in the work life tends to be high, 
efforts to facilitate phased retirement or other flexible work conditions may be 
more effective within the context of a career job. Hurd cautions, however, that 
any changes must be advantageous both to employers and employees, so that 
older workers will not be viewed as liabilities to their employer. Indeed, de- 
termining whether more flexible arrangements can work effectively within the 
constraints of team production and fixed employment costs is far from easy. 
Robin Lumsdaine, James Stock, and David Wise previously wrote a series 
of papers on the incentive effects of employer-provided pension plans, empha- 
sizing that plan provisions typically provide substantial incentives to retire 
early. If  employees do not retire before 65, a large fraction retire at age 65 
exactly. In this volume, Lumsdaine, Stock, and Wise consider why retirement 
rates are so high at 65. 
Age 65 is no longer the typical retirement age. Most employees now retire 
before 65, and those who are covered by  defined-benefit pension plans often 
retire well before 65. Nonetheless, a large fraction of  persons who are still 
working at 64 retire at 65. For example, at one of the Fortune 500 firms that 
are studied in this paper (Firm 3), 48% of men working at 64 retire at 65. In 
contrast, only 21% of men who work through age 63 retire at 64. Women at 
this firm show a similar increase in retirement rates, from 18% at age 64 to 
41% at age 65. Similar jumps in retirement rates at age 65 are found at other 
individual firms and more generally in nationwide measures of labor force par- 3  Introduction 
ticipation. In each of the six data sets discussed in this paper, the highest retire- 
ment rate occurs at age 65. 
In earlier papers, Lumsdaine, Stock, and Wise attributed the mismatch be- 
tween predicted and actual rates to an “age-65 retirement effect,” having in 
mind the influence of custom or accepted practice. This paper considers other 
commonly proposed explanations for the underprediction of  age-65 retire- 
ment. It is difficult to directly demonstrate the influence of  custom and the 
like. Thus the spirit of the paper is to rule out other explanations and thus, by 
implication, leave the age-65 retirement effect as the remaining possibility. The 
results suggest that such an effect is the only plausible explanation that cannot 
be rejected. In particular, the authors conclude that the availability of Medicare 
at 65 does not explain the age-65 retirement jump. 
The unexplained age-65 spike is important because it limits our ability to 
predict the effect of potential policy changes, like the planned increase in the 
Social Security normal retirement age from age 65 to age 67. Would there then 
be a spike at 67, or would it remain at 65? 
Lumsdaine, Stock, and Wise seek to quantify the age-65 retirement puzzle 
and to explore potential explanations for it. These include in particular the 
potential gap in health insurance coverage between retirement and the Medi- 
care eligibility age. They also consider whether family status affects age-65 
retirement. And  they  explore the possibility that previous results were im- 
portantly affected by  small samples of  older workers. Because so many em- 
ployees retire early, the number still employed at 65 is typically small. 
None of these possibilities explains the age-65 spike, lending indirect sup- 
port to the “age-65 retirement effect” explanation. To support the plausibility 
of an age-65 effect, the authors also consider the possibility that for some em- 
ployees the utility cost to electing to retire at this “customary” retirement age 
is small. They conclude that the economic cost is indeed small for some, al- 
though for most employees it is quite large. Thus, for most employees, choos- 
ing to retire at age 65 would impose noticeable economic cost. 
John Ausink and David Wise consider the military pension, compensation, 
and  retirement of  U.S. Air  Force pilots. Ausink and  Wise emphasize that 
econometric models of job exit are of  interest for at least two reasons. There 
has been a significant decline in the civilian labor force participation of older 
Americans for the past twenty years (Wise 1985). During the same period, 
private pension coverage has increased markedly, and Social Security benefits 
have risen. The study of relationships between the two trends is of interest to 
economists attempting to explain the incentives that pension plans may provide 
in encouraging workers to change jobs or stop working, and is also important 
to firms who may want to affect employee retirement behavior by changing the 
provisions of their pension plans. 
In  the military, there is a slightly different perspective. The armed forces 
must maintain adequate numbers of trained and experienced personnel without 
the realistic possibility of lateral job entry to replace losses. A shortage of expe- 4  David A. Wise 
rienced military pilots cannot be eliminated by hiring pilots from another mili- 
tary, for example. The absence of this remedy for the loss of personnel means 
that shortfalls in any cohort are difficult to correct, and the potential incentive 
effects of changes in compensation must be considered before they are made. 
In this paper, Ausink and Wise use the option value model of retirement 
behavior developed by Stock and Wise to examine the effects of compensation 
on the decision of Air Force pilots to leave the military. The authors conclude 
that the option value model captures Air Force pilot departure behavior much 
better than the annualized cost of  leaving model that has been used by  the 
military, and substantially better than a more complex stochastic dynamic pro- 
gramming specification. The superiority of the option value model to the dy- 
namic programming formulation raises the possibility that individual decision 
making may not always be best described with a model that is intended to 
approximate “correct” economic financial calculations. This is consistent with 
the results of previous work by Lumsdaine, Stock, and Wise (1992). 
Predictions of the effects of changes in compensation using the option value 
model indicate that individuals at early stages in their careers are more sensi- 
tive to losses of future benefits than indicated by previous models. The effects 
of temporary annual bonuses, such as Aviator Continuation Pay, are small, and 
bonus amounts must be extremely large to induce departure rates that come 
close to Air Force objectives. 
Ausink and Wise emphasize that the extraordinary changes in the world’s 
political and military climate since the summer of  1991 have already led to 
adjustments in the defense structure of the United States, and the number of 
Air Force personnel is declining. To encourage people to leave the military, the 
Air Force has instituted two incentive programs since 1992. The authors point 
out that both programs were introduced with little econometric modeling of 
their potential effects and that fewer officers than expected applied to either 
program. As the Air Force and other services struggle to reduce in size, other 
separation incentives will be proposed and studied. The authors conclude that 
the procedures studied in this paper may be useful in predicting the effects of 
such programs. 
Jonathan Gruber and Brigitte Madrian consider health insurance and early 
retirement. The dramatic decline in the labor force participation of older men 
in the past several decades has prompted many studies of retirement behavior. 
In particular, a great deal of attention has been given to the incentive effects of 
Social Security provisions and, more recently, to  the effects of  employer- 
provided pension plans. A potentially important factor that has not received 
much attention is the availability of health insurance for retirees. Gruber and 
Madrian point out that the increased availability of health insurance for older 
Americans, especially retirees, has come in several forms. First among them 
is the introduction in the mid- 1960s of Medicare, a federal program that pro- 
vides near-universal health insurance coverage for those over age 65. A second 
source of health insurance that has grown in importance, particularly for those 5  Introduction 
under age 65, is employer-provided postretirement health insurance. While 
only 30% of men who retired in the early 1960s received health insurance from 
their former employers, this fraction increased to almost half for those retiring 
in the 1980s (Madrian 1993). 
This paper looks at the effect on retirement of a third source of health insur- 
ance for early retirees, namely, continuation coverage benefits. During the late 
1970s and early 1980s, many states mandated that employers allow employees 
who leave their jobs to continue purchasing their group health insurance for a 
specified number of months. These continuation benefits were then extended 
to all workers in  1986 as part of  the federal Consolidated Omnibus Budget 
Reconciliation Act (COBRA). Although this coverage is available to all work- 
ers regardless of age, it should be particularly attractive to older workers who 
face a relatively high price for health insurance in the private market and who 
are more likely to be subject to the preexisting-conditions exclusions that are 
characteristic of such policies. 
Madrian and Gruber estimate the effect of health insurance on retirement by 
examining the effect of state and federal continuation coverage mandates on 
retirement behavior. They conclude that continuation coverage mandates have 
had a sizable effect on retirement. Contrary to their expectations, however, 
they conclude that the effects are not necessarily the strongest at older ages. 
Health Care 
In “Medicare Reimbursement and Hospital Cost Growth,” Mark McClellan 
poses four questions. Why did Medicare’s prospective payment system (PPS) 
lead to a decline in hospital admissions? Why is the average intensity per dis- 
charge increasing? Why do real per capita hospital costs keep increasing? And 
why aren’t the diagnosis-related groups (DRGs) that serve as a basis for Medi- 
care reimbursement of hospitals more related to diagnoses? 
McClellan’s study suggests that the PPS led to several unanticipated conse- 
quences. Under PPS, Medicare reimburses hospitals a fixed amount per pa- 
tient, based on the patient’s DRG. While many DRGs are indeed defined by 
diagnosis, McClellan makes the important observation that some DRGs are 
actually reimbursements for specific procedures (rather than just the diagnoses 
associated with those procedures). The results of the study indicate that hospi- 
tals are performing a lot more of the intensive treatments that are explicitly 
reimbursed (as DRGs), while intensity and admissions have remained constant 
or fallen for most diseases that are reimbursed by diagnosis alone. 
McClellan begins by setting forth in some detail a formal model of hospital 
production, emphasizing the critical roles of  four parties: fully insured pa- 
tients, physicians, hospitals, and regulators who set the price schedule for hos- 
pitals. He then compares the predictions of the model with empirical evidence, 
emphasizing that the four questions posed above are not so puzzling when 
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Among  other conclusions, McClellan emphasizes that  hospitals have  re- 
sponded quite dramatically to PPS, to the point that intensive surgical treat- 
ments dominate hospital care for the elderly. He concludes that all growth in 
the case-mix index of Medicare admissions since PPS implementation appears 
attributable to increasing use over time of the particular intensive technologies 
that are reimbursed separately under PPS. While these trends may be attribut- 
able to exogenous technological change, the model of hospital incentives for 
investing in intensive technologies for the treatment of health problems sug- 
gests they are not. He also concludes that feasible reforms in the structure of 
PPS reimbursement would be likely to mitigate these trends, at least for some 
health problems. 
Housing and Living Arrangements 
In “Living Arrangements: Health and Wealth Effects,” Axel Borsch-Supan, 
Daniel McFadden, and Reinhold Schnabel report several methodological de- 
velopments in modeling living arrangement decisions. Estimating models with 
multiple-outcome situations (such as living arrangements) has been a topic of 
econometric investigation for some time, and these authors have been instru- 
mental in finding solutions. The methodological developments in this paper 
are applied to the question of  how  health status and wealth affect living ar- 
rangement decisions, using panel data from the Longitudinal Study on Aging. 
Among the contributions of the paper are the econometric indicators of health 
status that are used in the analysis. 
The authors emphasize that the choice of a living arrangement-in  an inde- 
pendent household, in a shared living arrangement with adult children or oth- 
ers, or in an institution-has  many implications for the well-being of  an el- 
derly person.  First, there  are important relationships between  one’s  living 
arrangement and the level of care and assistance received by  the elderly. For 
example, living with other family members eases situations of illness, while 
living alone makes coping with illnesses more difficult. Second, living ar- 
rangement decisions  interact importantly with  government  assistance pro- 
grams, such as food stamps, supplemental Social Security, and Medicaid, as 
well as social support services such as district nursing or meals-on-wheels. 
Eligibility for public assistance both affects and is affected by living arrange- 
ment decisions. And third, because a large portion of the wealth of most older 
people is invested in housing, and because different housing arrangements 
have  different out-of-pocket costs, there are important interactions between 
financial status and living arrangement decisions. Selling a home, for example, 
may dramatically increase the liquid wealth of the elderly. 
The analysis in this paper accounts for many  of  these relationships. The 
authors conclude that, while wealth is an important economic variable in the 
choice of living arrangements, income is of little relevance once wealth is in- 
cluded. As expected, health is one of the main predictors of living arrangement 7  Introduction 
choices. Health is well captured in the analysis by two factors: one associated 
with independent activities and strongly related to age, and the other associated 
with more basic and person-specific capabilities. Living together with others, 
mainly children, is positively affected by financial and housing wealth. Moving 
to an institution is negatively affected by homeownership. 
Saving and Wealth 
Leslie Papke, Mitchell Petersen, and James Poterba ask, “Do 40  1  (k) plans 
replace other employer-provided pensions?’  The authors point out that, al- 
though a growing body of  evidence suggests that 401(k) contributors do not 
offset their contributions by  reducing their accumulation of  other financial 
assets, this does not necessarily mean that 401(k) contributions represent net 
additions to private saving. They could be offset by  reduced contributions to 
other pension plans. Based on a survey of  firms with 401(k) plans in  1987, 
Papke, Petersen, and Poterba investigate the degree of  substitution between 
40 1  (k) plans and other employer-provided retirement saving arrangements. 
They conclude that 401(k) plans do not appear to have displaced previous 
defined-benefit plans. None of the firms in their data reported substituting the 
401(k) plan for a defined-benefit plan. They did find, however, that several 
firms reported replacing previous thrift or profit-sharing plans with a 401(k) 
plan. The authors also explored the link between 401(k) participation rates 
and corporate matching rates. They found that a 50% matching rate increased 
employee participation by  only  10%. Thus they conclude that other factors 
must explain the high overall participation rate in 401(k) plans. 
Jonathan Skinner observes that recent fluctuations in housing prices have 
led to concern that the windfall gains enjoyed by  many of those currently re- 
tired could be matched in the future by windfall losses when the baby-boom 
generation retires. In his paper “Is Housing Wealth a Sideshow?’ Skinner con- 
siders the extent to which housing price fluctuations play an important role in 
the economic security of retirees. In particular, he asks whether housing wealth 
is an important determinant of  the consumption and saving of  the elderly or 
whether it is just a “sideshow.” 
Skinner pursues his analysis by  considering the degree to which the data 
are consistent with three economic models of behavior: the standard life-cycle 
model, a life-cycle model that includes a bequest motive, and a precautionary 
saving model. Skinner finds that an increase in housing wealth is associated 
with a small reduction in other saving, but that the elderly do not generally use 
their housing equity to finance consumption after retirement. He reconciles 
these two empiric irregularities by suggesting that housing wealth is a precau- 
tionary buffer against unanticipated financial needs. In this sense, the paper 
adds to the evidence for a precautionary view of saving and weighs against the 
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Stylized Models and  Simulations 
The intent of the papers in this part is to consider stylized models of behav- 
ior among the elderly, and how the behavior of hypothetical individuals in the 
models would be predicted to change by  varying some of the model parame- 
ters. The papers are not empirical in  that they  do not confront the stylized 
models with empirical evidence. Rather, they suggest factors that may be im- 
portant to include in behavioral models, and how those factors appear to influ- 
ence behavior in hypothetical simulations. 
Jonathan Feinstein develops a stylized dynamic model in “Elderly Health, 
Housing, and Mobility.” The goal of the paper is to elucidate the potentially 
complex relationship between health and housing decisions, and the role of 
mobility costs and other economic factors in this relationship. Rather than 
presenting empirical evidence on health and housing decisions, the conclu- 
sions of the paper are based on hypothetical simulations that characterize the 
model’s implications. Feinstein gives particular emphasis to the importance of 
“transitional” housing, such as retirement communities, life care, and shared 
living arrangements. 
David Weil’s paper, “Intergenerational  Transfers, Aging, and Uncertainty,” 
presents the findings of another thought experiment. Weil considers the degree 
to which anticipated bequests may reduce the saving of  potential recipients. 
Using a stylized overlapping-generations model, Weil characterizes the partic- 
ular influence of uncertainty about the age of the donor’s death and about the 
size of the future bequest. Based on his simulations,  Weil concludes that uncer- 
tainty delays the reduction in individual saving that might otherwise take place 
by potential recipients of bequests, and delays the reduction in aggregate sav- 
ing that may result from population aging. 
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